Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle by Crane, Daniel A.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2012
Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle
Daniel A. Crane
University of Michigan Law School, dancrane@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/127
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Computer Law Commons, and the
Marketing Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crane, Daniel A. "Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle." Geo. Mason L. Rev. 19, no. 5 (2012): 1199-209.
SEARCH NEUTRALITY AS AN ANTITRUST PRINCIPLE
Daniel A. Crane*
INTRODUCTION
Given the Internet's designation as "the great equalizer,"' it is unsur-
prising that nondiscrimination has emerged as a central aspiration of web
governance.2 But, of course, bias, discrimination, and neutrality are among
the slipperiest of regulatory principles. One person's bias is another per-
son's prioritization.
Fresh on the heels of its initial success in advocating a net neutrality
principle,' Google is in the uncomfortable position of trying to stave off a
corollary principle of search neutrality.' Search neutrality has not yet coa-
lesced into a generally understood principle, but at its heart is some idea
that Internet search engines ought not to prefer their own content on adja-
cent websites in search results but should instead employ "neutral" search
algorithms that determine search result rankings based on some "objective"
metric of relevance.'
Count me a skeptic. Whatever the merits of the net neutrality argu-
ment, a general principle of search neutrality would pose a serious threat to
the organic growth of Internet search. Although there may be a limited case
for antitrust liability on a fact-specific basis for acts of naked exclusion
against rival websites, the case for a more general neutrality principle is
weak. Particularly as Internet search transitions from the ten blue links
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am grateful to various individuals at both Google
and Microsoft for discussing these issues with me. All views expressed are solely my own. Elizabeth
Cuneo provided excellent research assistance.
1 See, e.g., William E. Kennard, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Super-
comm 2000 International Dinner: The Great Equalizer (June 5, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwekO14.html.
2 See JOVAN KURBALUA, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE 52 (4th ed. 2010)
(discussing nondiscrimination as one of"[t]he basic principles" of Internet regulators worldwide).
See Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?: Diagnosis and Response, 7 INDIAN J.L. &
TECH. 16, 19 (2011) (reporting that "Google's management and public policy staff have spoken in
favour of network neutrality").
4 Nate Anderson, Search Neutrality? How Google Became a Neutrality Target, ARS TECHNICA
(Apr. 29, 2010, 10:32 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/04/search-neutrality-google-
becomes-neutraliy.
5 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006) (citing Jason Lee Miller, Left, Right, or Center? Can a Search Engine Be
Biased?, WEBPRONEWS (May 10, 2005), http://archive.webpronews.com/insiderreports/searchinsider/
wpn-49-2005051 OLeftRightorCenterCanaSearchEngineBeBiased.html).
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model of just a few years ago to a model where search engines increasingly
provide end information and interface with website information, a neutrality
principle becomes incoherent.
I. FROM TEN BLUE LINKS TO INTEGRATED INFORMATION PLATFORM
A. Ten Blue Links
Much of the discourse about search neutrality seems to be predicated
on dated assumptions.' This is forgivable, since Internet search is evolving
at such a rapid pace that much information is stale shortly after it hits the
ether. Still, as with any highly dynamic sector, the speed with which state of
the art becomes state of the past supports a mildly Schumpeterian suspicion
that antitrust interventions may find it hard to keep pace with the market.
In any event, much of the search neutrality conversation seems to en-
vision the world of search circa, say, 2005. In this world, the relevant Inter-
net consisted of two different segments-websites and search engines.'
Websites were the Internet's information wells, places users went to access
content. Search engines did not provide ultimate information but only ways
to access information or intermediate information about ultimate infor-
mation. In this way, search engines' role was clear: generate a list of "the
best and most useful websites" so that users could leave the search engine
and get "to the right place as fast as possible."' With the aid of mathemati-
cal algorithms, search engines would respond to users' queries by providing
"ten blue links," or ten uniform resource locators (or URLs), and a short
(fair use doctrine-protected) extract for each result. Each link was then
rank-ordered according to the search terms users entered.' This mechanical
"intuition" determined the likelihood that pages would match what the user
was seeking."
In this paradigm, original sin entered the world with vertical integra-
tion. Once search engine companies began to integrate vertically by operat-
ing websites, they were tempted to manipulate the previously objective
6 See generally Rufus Pollack, Is Google the Next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regula-
tion in Internet Search 11 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-1265521.
7See id. at 8-11.
8 David Scheff, Playboy Interview: Google Guys, PLAYBOY, Sept. 2004, at 60, available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.14cZu.htm.
9 See The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing Before
the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Power of Google] (statement of Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.).
I0 See id. at 9.
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search algorithms to favor their own sites in their search results." Thus, in
response to a query suggesting an interest in finding driving directions,
Google might prioritize a link to Google Maps in its search results at the
expense of MapQuest. Given a sufficient dominance in search, Google
might then erode MapQuest's market position over time and entrench
Google Maps as the dominant driving directions site.12
In a moment, I will suggest that the "ten blue links" vision of Internet
search is woefully inadequate as an assumption for imposing a search neu-
trality principle. But, first, let us consider the "ten blue links" paradigm on
its own terms.
From an antitrust perspective, the ten blue links account seems to pre-
sent a standard problem of monopoly leverage following vertical integra-
tion. Think AT&T in 1975. Queue all of the usual arguments. 3 Monopoly
leverage makes no sense because the search engine monopolist would
merely cannibalize its own advertising revenues in search by raising the
price in the adjacent website. Response: the one monopoly profit argument
only holds if the complementary goods are consumed in fixed proportions,
which search services and sites are not. Further, advertisers, not consumers,
pay directly for most search services and website functions, and advertisers
experience websites and search engines not as complementary but as substi-
tute outlets. Counter-response: vertical integration eliminates double mar-
ginalization and hence leads to lower prices. And so forth.
Assuming for the sake of the argument that leveraging from a domi-
nant search engine to an adjacent website is, in theory, a rational business
move if the dominant firm can pull it off, one may ask whether this vision
has any correlation with reality. Just because a search engine is dominant
vis-a-vis other search engines, it does not necessarily have the power to
promote or demote adjacent websites to its advantage and in a way that
seriously affects the overall competitiveness of the adjacent market. This
would only be true if search engines were indispensible portals for access-
ing websites. They are not. Users link to websites from many origins-for
example, bookmarks, links on other websites, or links forwarded in e-
11 Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy
& Consumer Rights).
12 Indeed this is the argument advanced by Adam Raff, co-founder of Foundem, an Internet tech-
nology firm that runs a vertical search website in the United Kingdom. According to Raff, Google's
"preferential placement of Google Maps helped it unseat MapQuest from its position as America's
leading online mapping service virtually overnight." Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, but You May Not
Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/
opinion/28raff.html. Further, the company's "domination of the global search market and ability to
penalize competitors while placing its own services at the top of its search results" created a "virtually
unassailable competitive advantage" that, when deployed, "toppled" incumbents, "suppressed" new
entrants, and "imperiled" innovation. Id.
13 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer,
What's the Question?, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 151 (2012).
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mails--other than search engines. Even dominant search engines account
for a relatively small percentage of the traffic origins.
For example, when Google acquired the travel-search software com-
pany ITA in 2011, rivals complained that Google would use its dominance
in search to steer consumers to a Google travel site instead of rival sites like
Expedia, Travelocity, and Priceline.14 But even if Google did that, it is hard
to imagine that this could be fatal to rival travel search sites. According to
Complete, Inc. data, only a small volume of traffic into the three big travel
search sites originated with a Google search-12 percent for Expedia and
10 percent for Travelocity and Priceline." The percentage of Yahoo! travel
and Bing travel (Microsoft's service) originating with Google is even
smaller-7 percent and 4 percent respectively.'"
One has to be careful with search origin data of this sort. It might be
that Google accounts for the immediate origin in only a small percentage of
cases but accounts for the initial search leading to a particular site in a much
larger percentage of cases. For example, users may begin with a Google
search, link to an intermediate site, and then link to the ultimate site. If
there is a high amount of path dependence in search-meaning that the
search engine a user begins with has a large influence on where they end
up, regardless of the number of intermediate steps-then the exercise of
market power at the first search stage could have effects far downstream.
Still, it is unlikely that search engines are anything approaching essen-
tial facilities for most websites." Even studies that attribute a large share of
search origin to Google generally report that Google accounts for signifi-
cantly less than 50 percent of website traffic.'" Newer sites may be more
reliant on search origins than more established sites," but even newer sites
14 See Greg Sterling, Google's Travel Opponents Hoping Bigger Antitrust Case Will Soon Fol-
low, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Apr. 8, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://searchengineland.com/googies-travel-
opponents-hoping-for-bigger-antitrust-action-to-come-72298.
15 Daniel A. Crane, Presentation at the George Mason Law Review Symposium: Search Neutrality
as an Antitrust Principle (Jan. 26, 2012) (on file with George Mason Law Review).
16 id
17 On the essential facilities doctrine, see generally 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 771c (3d ed. 2008).
18 See Omar Khan, How Much of an Average Website's Traffic Comes from Google?,
www.isico.com/blog/how-much-average-websites-traffic-comes-google (last visited May 20, 2011)
(reporting that search drove 61 percent of all visits to twenty-one sampled websites and that Google
organic search drove an average of 41 percent of traffic to the sampled websites); Mike Blumenthal,
Understanding Google Places and Local Search-Developing Knowledge About Local Search,
BLUMENTHALS (Jan. 11, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://blumenthals.com/blog/2011/01/11 /how-much-traffic-
do-local-sites-get-from-google (reporting that in 2009, 36.9 percent of the total traffic from the studied
sites came from Google search).
19 What Percentage of Website Traffic Should Be Generated from Search Engines, ROI.COM.AU
(May 2, 2011), http://www.roi.com.au/beginners-search-engine-marketing/what-of-website-traffic
should-be-generated-from-search-engines (reporting that "[s]earch engines typically drive between
70%-80% of all web traffic to a newly established website").
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have options-such as advertising in other media or purchasing sponsored
links-that do not require a high search rank to obtain traffic.
Thus, a major flaw in the monopoly leverage story is that even if a par-
ticular search engine were dominant as a search vehicle, search engines are
not necessarily dominant when it comes to reaching websites. In most cas-
es, a critical mass of users knows where they want to go without conducting
a search. Manipulation of a search engine to favor particular sites might
induce more traffic to visit the site, but it seems unlikely that it could fore-
close customers from reaching competitive sites.
B. Integrated Information Portal
1. Changing Patterns of Internet Search
The ten blue links vision of Internet search is outdated. Increasingly,
search engines are not merely providing intermediate information but ulti-
mate information, the answers themselves.20 Or, if the search engine re-
mains a step removed from the ultimate information, it is integrated with
the ultimate information.2 1 Increasingly, it is not accurate to speak about
search engines and websites as distinct spaces or the relationship between
search and content as vertical. The lines are blurring at ether speed.
This progression is driven by users' own preferences. As the head of
Yahoo! Labs and Yahoo!'s search strategy explained in 2009, "[p]eople
don't really want to search. . . . Their objective is to quickly uncover the
information they are looking for, not to scroll through a list of links to Web
pages."22 Consequently, search engines are no longer just focusing on doc-
ument retrieval. Instead, they are working towards direct question answer-
ing." By "figur[ing] out the 'intent' of the person conducting the search"
and then displaying all the related content that he might want to see, search
engines are shifting away from the paradigmatic ten blue links towards a
world of richer results."
20 Facts About Google and Competition: Better Answers, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
competition/betteranswers.html (last visited July 1, 2012).
21 An October 2010 study published by comScore, Inc. indicated that one-third of all searches
performed on the Big Three search engines contained a non-web source like news, videos, or images
within their results. In particular, Bing and Google included these "blended results" 54 percent and 33
percent of the time, respectively. Eli Goodman & Eli Feldblum, Blended Search and the New Rules of
Engagement, COMSCORE, 7-8 (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www2.comscore.com/1/1552/ore-
RankAboveBlendedSearch-pdf/34z2rq.
22 James Niccolai, Yahoo Vows Death to the "10 Blue Links", PCWORLD (May 19, 2009, 8:40
PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/165214/yahoo vows death to the 10 blue links.
html.
23 See Oren Etzioni, Search Needs a Shake-Up, 476 NATURE 25, 26 (2011).
24 See Niccolai, supra note 22.
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Consider a few examples-examples which may only hold as of the
precise date of this writing, May 1, 2011. Go to Google and type "How tall
is the Empire State Building?" In the search results, before the display of
the now proverbial ten blue links, you will find the following nugget: "Best
Guess for Empire State Building Height is 1,250 Feet." This is ultimate
information-probably enough to satisfy most high school students doing
research papers-not a blue link. To be sure, if you want to dig further, the
"show sources" button will let you ask for sources and blue links will ap-
pear. But for many users, the search engine itself is the end of the road-the
answer.
Now go to Bing and type "New York to Rome." After an initial spon-
sored link, a conventional flight universal search box appears, of the type
Internet users are accustomed to seeing inside the walled garden of an air-
line website or a traditional travel site: from and to, leave and return with
calendar functionality. A small side panel lists price estimates for various
departure dates. We are still within the search engine but clearly beyond the
world of blue links. Conventional website functionality appears comingled
with traditional search functionality. Type in dates and search again. Up
come a list of results-not links, but flight schedules and prices. Now-for
Bing as of May 1, 2011-in order to complete the transaction you will have
to select a vendor (say Orbitz or American Airlines) and here Bing finally
does act as a traditional search engine and send you on your way to a web-
site that will take ownership over the last leg of the transaction. Google's
acquisition of ITA may push this sort of travel search even further into
seamless (to the user) integration where the line between search engine and
website may vanish altogether.
A final experiment: go to Yahoo! Before you even type in your search
query, observe that you are treated to news headlines-ultimate infor-
mation-on the front page. Now type "Venice" in the search query bar. The
first search results page is cluttered with information: local time; current
weather and forecast; maps; pictures; and, of course, sponsored and un-
sponsored links. From the search results screen you might find all of the
information you needed to know about Venice and never click on a blue
link.
This is the evolving world of search. As a senior vice president of Ya-
hoo! explained in 2011, it is time "to re-imagine search. The new landscape
for search will likely focus on getting the answers the user needs without
requiring the user to interact with a page of traditional blue links. In fact,
there may be cases where there are no blue links on a search results page at
all."25
25 Shashi Seth, A New Era of Search Is About the Answers, Not Just the Links, TECHCRUNCH
(May 7, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/07/search-answers-not-just-links/?utm-source=
feedbumer&utm medium=feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCrunch%29.
1204 [VOL. 19:5
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What does it mean to discriminate in favor of one's own services in a
world where search and services have merged, where the search engine is
not merely linking to external information but serving up information inter-
faces and data? If Google decides to provide a map on the search results
front page, must it select a "neutral" way of determining whether the map
will be drawn from Google Maps or from AOL's MapQuest service? If
Microsoft embeds ticket purchasing functionality in Bing, must it make
interfaces to its competitor's services available on an equal basis? If Yahoo!
answers a stock price quotation query by listing current prices and suggest-
ing a means of purchasing the stock, must it list the most popular brokerage
sites in rank order rather than offering to undertake the transaction itself or
through one of its partners?
Affirmative answers to these hypothetical questions would freeze the
evolution of the search engine. Unless the search engine is to remain stuck
in the ten blue links paradigm, search engine companies must have the
freedom to make strategic choices about the design of their services, includ-
ing the decision to embed proprietary functions traditionally performed by
websites in the engine's search properties. Such freedom is inconsistent
with an expansive principle of search neutrality, but it is indispensible to
Internet search innovation.
The evolution of Internet search is leading to the redefinition of many
markets and dislocations of many media and technology companies. As
Ken Auletta has observed, the evolution of search makes Google "a fre-
nemy to most media companies."26 Be that as it may, the search engine's
evolution evidences Schumpeter's "gales of creative destruction," which
are indispensible to large-scale progress in a market economy.
2. Special Rules for Google?
Despite the fact that all of Internet search is rapidly evolving toward a
radical redefinition of the search engine, some believe that Google-and, of
course, the search neutrality discourse is directed against Google-should
have a special obligation to evolve in a nondiscriminatory manner.27 There
are two arguments for a Google-specific obligation.
First, Google might be subject to special obligations of neutrality and
transparency because it has long marketed its search engine as a neutral
algorithmic platform. 28 Empirical work shows that users place a large de-
26 KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNow IT 254 (2009).
27 See Sterling, supra note 14.
28 As Senator Herb Kohl recently remarked, "[t]he search premise of Google at its founding was
that it would build an unbiased search engine that consumers would see the most relevant search result
first, and that the search results would not be influenced by the web page's commercial relationship with
Google." Power of Google, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Hon. Herb Kohl, Chairman, S. Subcomm.
12052012]
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gree of trust in Google's perceived neutrality in ranking relevance to que-
ries, often substituting Google's algorithmic judgment of relevance for their
own evaluation of search result abstracts.2 9 This perhaps differentiates
Google from rival search engines, which have not proclaimed their objec-
tivity or created neutrality expectations among their users. Microsoft, for
example, characterizes Bing not as a search engine but as a "[d]ecision
[e]ngine," which incorporates the user's subjective preferences to render a
customized search result.30 From the beginning, Bing's functionality has
been much closer to that of a web portal than a "ten blue links" type of
search engine.
This argument seems a rather thin reed. It surely cannot be the case
that Google is prohibited to keep pace with the evolution of Internet search
just because its customers once associated it with the ten blue links model.
Unless Google materially distorts competition by knowingly deceiving cus-
tomers about the nature of its offerings, it is hard to see why past expecta-
tions should in any way dictate future obligations.
This brings us to the second claim-that Google, and Google alone,
should have special neutrality obligations because it is so dominant in
search." Assuming that Google is sufficiently dominant to count as a mo-
nopolist under U.S. law or dominant undertaking under EU law, this is still
not a compelling reason to lock Google into a neutrality obligation. Domi-
nant firms may sometimes have special antitrust obligations not shared by
weaker rivals, but those obligations should never stand in the way of the
firm's ability to innovate. Application of a broad neutrality principle--one
that prohibited Google from favoring its own adjacent services in respond-
ing to customer queries-would severely handicap Google in the continu-
ing evolution of Internet search.
on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights). Indeed, for its 2004 IPO Google made clear:
"[w]e will do our best to provide the most relevant and useful search results possible, independent of
financial incentives. Our search results will be objective and we will not accept payment for inclusion or
ranking in them." Google Inc., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.14cZu.htm.
29 Bing Pan et al, In Google We Trust: Users' Decisions on Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 801, 801 (2007).
30 Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft's New Search at Bing.com Helps People Make Better
Decisions (May 28, 2009), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2009/may09/05-28new
searchpr.aspx.
31 This argument is premised on the notions that "[s]earch is the critical gateway by which users
navigate the web" and that search traffic drives development on the Internet. Power ofGoogle, supra
note 9, at 182 (statement of Thomas 0. Bamett, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP). As such, Google's
dominance gives the company not only "unprecedented power to steer users and to stifle competition,"
but to raise prices and reduce innovation as well. Id.
1206 [VOL. 19:5
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II. Is ANTITRUST MADE FOR THIS PROBLEM?
A. Against a General Principle of Search Neutrality
The foregoing discussion suggests that there should be no general
principle of search neutrality. At most, the available theory should be lim-
ited to a highly fact-specific claim that a dominant search engine deliberate-
ly overrode its ordinary algorithmic protocols to disadvantage a competitive
service (or a noncompetitive service when instigated by a rival of that ser-
vice), without any reasonably believed efficiency justification, in a way that
created, preserved, or enlarged market power. Let us consider each of the
relevant elements separately.
First, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the demotion
was deliberate-that the defendant specifically targeted the plaintiff's ser-
vice for a disadvantage. Accidental slights to a competitor's search results
ranking-which probably occur periodically given the sheer volume of
programming parameters-should not give rise to antitrust liability.
Second, the plaintiff should be required to show that the defendant
overrode its ordinary algorithmic protocols. In the case of Foundem, for
example, Google allegedly applied a penalty filter that demoted Foundem's
"natural" ranking position.32 Such deliberate demotion of a competitor's
search ranking would meet the second element. What this requirement
would exclude, however, is a claim that the search engine algorithm was
designed to advantage the search engine's adjacent services or disadvantage
particular kinds of competitors. Scrutiny of such product design decisions is
not a proper antitrust function.
Third, antitrust liability should only attach to actions directed against
competitors of the search engine or actions instigated by rivals of the disad-
vantaged service. This requirement would essentially track the logic of
Robinson-Patman Act jurisprudence by limiting scrutiny to competitive
effects felt at the primary or secondary levels. It would exclude efforts to
create an antitrust principle of general fairness to all vertically related com-
panies.
Fourth, no liability should attach if the search engine company reason-
ably believed that its decision was necessary to advance the efficiency of its
service. Two limitations on liability are embedded in this formulation of the
test. First, a good faith belief that a particular business decision was neces-
sary to advance the functioning of the service should suffice to eliminate
antitrust liability. Consistent with the principles underlying the business
judgment rule, courts or agencies should defer to decisions the search en-
gine firm could reasonably have reached under the circumstances, whether
32 Foundem's Google Story, SEARCH NEUTRALITY (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.search
neutrality.org/foundem-google-story.
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or not the court or agency would reach the same decision on the litigation or
investigatory record. Second, courts and agencies should not seek to bal-
ance the procompetitive effects of the decision against its anticompetitive
consequences, as some courts and commentators have suggested is a neces-
sary step in monopolization analysis. Such balancing is plagued by difficul-
ties in any context but is particularly inappropriate in the highly dynamic
world of Internet search, where the value of any particular product design
decision often cannot be realized until it nears obsolescence.
Finally, as in any antitrust case, liability should only attach to acts that
have anticompetitive effects-those acts that create, enhance, or preserve
market power. Acts of "pure malice" that do not result in distortions of the
competitive market belong to the world of tort, not antitrust.
This proposed test would potentially allow search engine liability for
acts of intentional naked exclusion-selective demotion of rivals' services
without any plausible efficiency explanation. This would be a high bar for
any plaintiff to meet, but it leaves open the door to liability in the most
egregious cases of exclusion.
B. The Perils ofProcess
As with most issues of exclusionary conduct in highly dynamic indus-
tries, there are significant administrative obstacles to the implementation of
a search neutrality principle. Given that search engine companies make
thousands of complex decisions about the ordering of search results, the
management of a general search neutrality principle would require either an
army of bureaucrats or a technical committee dwarfing the one mandated
by the Microsoft consent decree. The costs of such a program and the po-
tential for abuses seem large compared to the potential benefits for competi-
tion.
Further, such a program-if conducted by the government-would
raise serious free speech concerns. If we consider the query-and-response
format of Internet search a conversation between a user and a service pro-
vider, then the search engine design would seem to enjoy some degree of
constitutional protection.33 This is not to say that any imposition of antitrust
liability would be ipso facto unconstitutional.34 Rather, it acknowledges that
a pervasive governmental role in refereeing Internet search would lead to
various entanglements that democracies prefer to avoid."
33 See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *9-13
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (holding that Google's PageRanks are subjective opinions protected by the
First Amendment).
34 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Ac-
countability in the Law ofSearch, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1195-96 (2008).
35 See Sterling, supra note 14.
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CONCLUSION
Internet search is evolving at breakneck speed. There is an argument
that this is precisely the time when antitrust intervention to ensure a com-
petitive playing field is most warranted-that once the dust settles and
dominant players have locked in their positions due to network effects,
scale economies, first mover advantages, and the other usual entry barriers,
the game will be up. The counterargument is that high market velocity is a
reason for antitrust regulators and courts to take a seat on the sidelines-to
wait out the gales of creative destruction and only enter the game once the
market settles into more sedulous activity and a more predictable path.
Mandating a broad search neutrality principle would unwisely favor
the first argument. It would lock dominant search engines into a dated mod-
el of Internet search and freeze their evolution, even while their rivals
would have a free hand to innovate. Such a rule would certainly diminish
Google's dominance-but only because it would prohibit Google from
meeting customers' needs by offering a more seamless and integrated
search and transaction experience. Antitrust law should never seek to de-
stroy dominance by prohibiting dominant firms from innovating to keep up
with their customers' changing demands.
While a broad search neutrality principle is neither feasible nor desira-
ble, this does not mean that dominant search engines should never be liable
for intentionally interfering with their rivals' hits in search results. Any
such liability should be narrow, carefully tailored, and predictable. Search
neutrality may thus have a future, not as a general principle, but as the mis-
fitting tag line on fact-specific findings of egregious abuses by dominant
search engines.
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